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"QUOTIDIAN" JUDGES vs. AL-QAEDA
Mark S. Davies*
TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS. By Eric
A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press. 2007. Pp. 3, 307.
INTRODUCTION
In Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts, University of
Chicago law professors Eric A. Posner' and Adrian Vermeule 2 invite those of
us worried about the American response to al-Qaeda to consider the proper
• 3
role of judges. Judges, of course, are not being dispatched to the hills of
Pakistan nor are they securing our borders or buildings. But as the executive
seeks to implement a range of new policies in the name of protecting us
from al-Qaeda, the judicial treatment of these policies shapes the American
response.
Posner and Vermeule suggest a kind of Hippocratic view of the judicial
response to the executive's antiterrorist measures: First, do no harm. Judges,
the authors argue, should let the executive do what it wants, both because
the executive has the expertise to act and because there is no reason to be-
lieve judicial intervention will improve matters. Furthermore, Posner and
Vermeule argue, judges in practice do stand aside and let the expert execu-
tive agencies do their jobs. The authors offer a blend of a normative view
(that judges should not interfere) and a descriptive account (that judges will
never meaningfully interfere).
In this Review, I suggest that the proper judicial role in the fight against
al-Qaeda is the mundane one of improving executive performance through
judicial review for arbitrary agency action. I don't mean to say that judges'
only involvement in any terrorism case is to review for agency arbitrariness
under the Administrative Procedure Act. The point is a more general one:
regardless of the precise legal context, judges should and in fact often do
* Counsel, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, and formerly an attorney in the Department of Jus-
tice. I would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Stanley and her students in the Security Studies
Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University for a discussion on the themes
of this essay, and my wife, Rachel Laser, for comments on an early draft. The views represented in
this essay are mine alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice. I
can be contacted at <mdavies@omm.com>.
I. Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
2. At the time he co-authored the book, Professor Vermeule was at the University of Chi-
cago Law School; he is now at Harvard Law School.
3. By "al-Qaeda," I mean to include all violent Islamic fundamentalists who target the
United States.
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seek only to assure that the executive has a reasonable explanation for its
actions.
Part I of this Review describes the authors' arguments for complete judi-
cial deference to the executive's antiterrorism measures. The authors assume
that the government is as well motivated in implementing security measures
as it is in implementing any other government function. Emphasizing com-
parative institutional competence, the authors claim that there is no reason
to believe that judicial intervention will improve those measures. The au-
thors illustrate these points with the World War II Korematsu case, the
possibility of government-sanctioned torture, and the regime of detention of
enemy combatants.
Part II argues for a "quotidian" form of judicial review of the executive's
antiterrorism actions. The essential task in the fight against al-Qaeda is, first
and foremost, effective executive action. Although some have proposed that
a specialized court like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court offers a
sound model of judicial review in this context, the FISA court does not ap-
pear to have improved executive performance in the fight against our
enemies. Accepting the authors' view that the motivations behind govern-
ment antiterrorist measures are at least as well intentioned as the
motivations behind any other agency action, judges still have a vital if ordi-
nary role: Judges should do nothing more and nothing less than assure that
the proposed agency action is reasonable.
I. (COMPLETELY) "DEFERENTIAL" JUDGES
As Posner and Vermeule see it, the fundamental question raised by the
threat from al-Qaeda is how to balance "liberty" and "security" (p. 27). Un-
der their "tradeoff thesis," neither liberty nor security can be maximized
independently from the other (p. 28). The problem for society "is one of
optimization: to choose the point along the frontier that maximizes the joint
benefits of security and liberty" (pp. 26-27). So, for example, the authors
see tradeoffs between security and liberty in the decisions of whether to
permit military commissions rather than courts to try noncitizen detainees
charged as enemy combatants, and whether to prohibit the government from
torturing suspected terrorists (p. 26). More technically, the authors describe
a "security-liberty frontier," in which "any increase in security will require a
decrease in liberty, and vice versa," a frontier that may change over time as
the relative threats increase or diminish (p. 26).
Posner and Vermeule argue that when thinking about the judicial role,
we should assume that the executive is making policy decisions at the secu-
rity-liberty frontier (p. 29). The authors assume that although the executive
may not always choose the best policies, "it does choose accurately on aver-
age" (p. 29). Their "theory of emergency politics" likewise assumes "a
rational and well motivated government" in the sense that its mistakes ex-
hibit a random distribution (pp. 20, 27, 29). Thus, the "decision to infringe
civil liberties for security purposes may be right or wrong, but it is no more
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"Quotidian" Judges vs. al-Qaeda
likely right or wrong that the quotidian decision to construct a highway or
reduce funding for education" (p. 30).
Posner and Vermeule argue that when, as now, the country faces a na-
tional emergency, judges should step aside and let the president and his
executive branch act to address the crisis. Put bluntly, "[i]n times of emer-
gency, judges should get out of the government's way ... " (p. 12). On this
"deferential view," judicial review of government action "should be relaxed
or suspended during an emergency" (p. 15). "If dissent weakens resolve,
then dissent should be curtailed .... If domestic security is at risk, intrusive
searches should be tolerated" (p. 16).
The final two sentences of the book distill the authors' point:
"We hope merely to clear the ground for government to react to emergen-
cies, enabling it to adopt whatever policies survive review by national
security experts and the political process. Such policies will often be mis-
taken, . . . [but] nothing in the lawyer's expertise supplies the necessary
tools for improving on the government's choices).
As that last sentence indicates, the authors justify their deferential view
with claims of comparative institutional competence: "If courts were per-
fectly informed and well-motivated, then they might weed out bad
emergency policies chosen by irrational or ill-motivated governments. But
we just do not have courts of that sort" (p. 31). "Judges are generalists, and
the political insulation that protects them from current politics deprives
them of information, especially information about novel security threats and
necessary responses to those threats" (p. 31). When judges or academic
commentators say that government has wrongly assessed the net benefits or
costs of some security policy or other, "they are amateurs playing at security
policy, and there is no reason to expect that courts can improve upon gov-
ernment's emergency policies in any systematic way" (p. 31). In short,
"there is an institutional dilemma facing judges who must review the execu-
tive's emergency policies; the problem is that the judges lack competence to
evaluate those policies" (p. 49).
Based on these general concerns, the authors offer the following assess-
ment of the "notorious" Korematsu case, which upheld the government's
internment of Japanese aliens and Japanese-American citizens during World
War 11. 4 In the authors' view, "decisions like Korematsu are inevitable"
(p. 122). Judges cannot adequately "evaluate the need for facially discrimi-
natory policies in times of emergency, and because the judges know this,
there is little point asking them to apply genuinely strict scrutiny to such
policies" (p. 122). "[W]hen the next emergency comes around, the judges
will defer again-not to the exact same policy, because circumstances will
always be different, but to a new emergency policy whose justification the
judges know themselves unable to evaluate."
Take the question of government-sanctioned torture or "coercive inter-
rogation" (p. 187). Describing torture as a "tragic choice" (p. 187), the
4. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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authors argue that "coercive interrogation should be legalized and subjected
to regulatory oversight" (p. 184). Just as police are allowed to use deadly
force, and just as the government will put murderers to death, the law should
at times permit the use of torture. The authors argue that "coercive interro-
gation" can be beneficial because it "produces information that prevents
harms, in a nontrivial range of cases" (p. 195). In their view, torture should
be "subject to a standard set of regulations" that would include "rules that
state what is permitted," "immunity for officials who obey the rules," and
"internal regulatory oversight by executive branch officials" (pp. 185-86).
In short, law has a "strategy for coping with grave evils that sometimes pro-
duce greater goods," and that strategy should apply to permit coercive
interrogation (p. 214). And, consistent with their "deferential view," the au-
thors purport to see no role for judges in this coercive interrogation scheme.
"Nonjudicial politics may or may not strike the optimal balance between the
costs and benefits of interrogation, but there is no reason to think the judges
will do better.. . ." (p. 207). Further, "if a government is intent on engaging
in interrogation to protect national security there is little the judges can do
about it anyway" (p. 208).
Posner and Vermeule also apply their "deferential view" to the question
of executive detention of "enemy combatants" (p. 251). In discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,5 they criticize the Court's
suggestion that indefinite detention of combatants may not be constitution-
ally permissible (p. 252). In their view, it is "unlikely" that the government
would not release a combatant who "no longer poses a threat" (p. 255). The
authors also criticize the Hamdi Court's requirement that the executive pro-
vide detainees with additional due process. The majority "does not explain
why the judges should apply the [due process] balancing test themselves,
rather than simply deferring to the balance the government had previously
struck" (p. 256). In their view, "judges can do no better than the government
on average, and will probably do worse from lack of information and exper-
tise" (p. 256). As to the noncitizen enemy combatants detained in
Guantanamo Bay, the authors again argue for complete judicial deference,
criticizing the Rasul v. Bush6 decision (p. 258), which permitted lawsuits to
challenge enemy combatant status. The authors also note, but do not appear
to approve of, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,' which gives the District
of Columbia Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
executive's conclusion that an individual is an enemy combatant (p. 259).
In sum, the authors claim that judges have little if any role in the fight
* against al-Qaeda. The authors argue that only the executive has the policy
expertise to implement sound antiterrorism policies. In other words, we are
at our safest when our judges stand aside.
5. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
6. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd, 2000dd-1 (2000); see also 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000) (delineating
procedures for review).
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II. "QUOTIDIAN" JUDGES
When deciding the proper role, if any, for judges in the fight against al-
Qaeda, I assume, for the purposes of this essay, that the authors are correct
that the key question is what form of judicial review will lead to the best
antiterrorist policies. In so assuming, I bracket other reasons for judicial
review, such as vindicating democratic values. Others have made these
points. Here, my interest is solely in how best to protect against imminent
attack. Thus, the principal difficulty is assuring that our national security
agencies act based on accurate facts and logical thinking. So, the question is
what form of judicial review is most likely to assure that we get the best
possible performance from our security agencies.
Many point to the FISA Court as a possible model for judicial review in
the terrorism context.' The authors, for example, discuss a "torture warrant"
proposal. Under this "judicial review writ small," "coercive interrogation
should be permitted only after officials have obtained a 'torture warrant'
from a judge" (p. 208). The authors, though, see a "serious concern" that the
torture warrant "will simply be an empty formality," with the government
eventually obtaining those warrants with something like the ninety-nine per-
cent success rate it has in obtaining warrants in the FISA court (p. 209).
Many have voiced similar concerns.
To further illustrate problems with the FISA court model, consider the
executive's handling of Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon lawyer and convert to
Islam.9 In March 2004, violent Islamic fundamentalists-inspired by al-
Qaeda-blew up four commuter trains in Madrid. A judge on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, reviewing evidence obtained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and presented by the Office of Intelligence Policy
Review ("OIPR"), authorized electronic surveillance of Mayfield. Two
weeks later, however, the FBI concluded that no real evidence linked May-
field to the bombings, and the FBI soon apologized. The extensive review
by the Office of Inspector General found, at bottom, a lack of FBI rigor.'0
The Mayfield example demonstrates that the FISA court may not pro-
vide a judicial check that advances the effectiveness of the executive's
response to terrorism. The reasons for this judicial ineffectiveness probably
include that only the government presents its side of the story (though OIPR
tries to consider all sides), that the procedural complications (timing and
signature requirements, for example) overwhelm consideration of the factual
substance of the application, and that there is a lack of meaningful appellate
8. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was established by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000). The Court may approve electronic sur-
veillance to "obtain foreign intelligence information" if there is "probable cause" to believe the
target is an "agent of a foreign power." Id. § 1805.
9. Susan Schmidt & Blaine Harden, Lawyer is Cleared of Ties to Bombings, WASH. POST,
May 25, 2004, at A2.
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI's
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 17, 205, 269 (2006).
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oversight (the FISA appeals court has sat only once"). Of course, we might
consider certain reforms to the FISA court, such as a formal system for non-
governmental groups to present legal arguments to the court, or perhaps
even a public defender type of office that would have the necessary security
clearances to challenge the government in these proceedings. Other meas-
ures could include simplified procedural requirements that would keep the
focus on the executive's factual claims, and perhaps a supervisory role for
the D.C. Circuit. Nevertheless, if we are seeking a model of judicial review
that advances security, there is little reason to think that the FISA Court, at
least as currently set up, advances that goal.
Although the FISA model assumes that terrorism issues raise distinctive
concerns warranting a special court, the opposite is probably closer to the
truth. Recall the authors' statement that the "decision to infringe on civil
liberties for security purposes may be right or wrong, but it is no more likely
to be right or wrong than the quotidian decision to construct a highway or
reduce funding for education" (p. 30). More generally, the authors contend
that executive actions against al-Qaeda are no more or less suspect than
other types of executive actions. A judge, however, does not "get out of the
way" of, for example, the latest highway regulations or Department of Edu-
cation plan. Instead, the judiciary engages in the familiar review for
arbitrary agency action. That the executive response to al-Qaeda is, at bot-
tom, "quotidian" agency action leads to the view that the ordinary judicial
review of agency action should obtain. 
2
Consider the following example: A principal component of the domestic
response to al-Qaeda has been the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"). 3 As the authors write, an "emergency calls for large-
scale organization and a change in bureaucratic routines" (p. 119). Creation
of the Department was not straightforward, and Congress struggled mightily
with the question of collective-bargaining rights of federal employees at the
new agency. 4 The executive issued regulations setting up a human resources
scheme, and the labor unions challenged the scheme under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the litigation,
there can be no question of the judges' competence to evaluate whether the
executive's regulations made sense. There is little connection between the
11. In re Sealed Case, 310 E 3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
12. The reasons why the judiciary needs to review executive action taken in the name of
fighting al-Qaeda are the same reasons the judiciary reviews any executive action. For various rea-
sons, agencies sometimes get things wrong. Courts can sometimes fix this. In the real world, of
course, different agencies may receive more or less intrusive judicial review based on a judge's
sense of the agency's credibility. But there is no reason to think that judges cannot find the right
level of review to apply to security agencies so that those agencies learn to provide well thought-out
explanations for their actions.
13. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security and
assigned it the mission to "prevent terrorist attacks within the United States" and "reduce the vul-
nerability of the United States to terrorism." 6 U.S.C. § II l(a)-(b) (Supp. 1112003).
14. The statutory language authorizes DHS to create a human resources management system
that is "flexible" and ensures that employees may "bargain collectively." 5 U.S.C. § 9701 (Supp. III
2003).
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D.C. Circuit's actual consideration of the DHS regulations and the picture of
the judge set forth by Posner and Vermeule. The questioning from the panel
was informed, and the judges seemed well able to "weed out bad emergency
policies chosen by irrational or ill-motivated governments" (p. 31). There
was no question of judicial competence.'- Likewise, there are other instances
in which the judiciary has engaged in what can only be described as a mean-
ingful evaluation of the executive's security claims.
6
Under the "quotidian" judicial review scheme suggested here, the judi-
cial role in the coercive interrogation context is to assure that the agency's
actions are not arbitrary. As noted, the authors propose that torture should be
"subject to a standard set of regulations" that would include "rules that state
what is permitted," "immunity for officials who obey the rules," and "inter-
nal regulatory oversight by executive branch officials" (p. 185-86). Any
such regulations should provide for the type of judicial review that is always
available when regulations are issued and applied. Thus, the judiciary
should decide whether the proposed coercive regulations are rational. And,
within the confines of the necessary security measures, the judiciary should
verify that a particular application of coercive measures is not arbitrary.
Similarly, the right judicial role in the detention of "enemy combatants"
is to assure that the designation is not arbitrary. Indeed, that is the very role
the Supreme Court may have in mind: "Any process in which the Execu-
tive's factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed
correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate
otherwise falls constitutionally short."' 7 So too, Congress has not seen fit to
eliminate the judiciary in this context. Rather, Congress granted to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to "determine the validity of
any final decision,"' 8 including whether the government's conclusion is
"supported by a preponderance of the evidence"' 9 by the executive that an
alien is an enemy combatant.
CONCLUSION
In Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts, University of
Chicago law professors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule focus our atten-
tion on the role of judges in the fight against al-Qaeda. The authors argue
15. P. 65. After I submitted this essay, the D.C. Circuit issued its fifty-page opinion in Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
16. For example, Section 302 of the Antiterrorism Act authorized the Secretary of State to
designate an entity as a "foreign terrorist organization" if the Secretary found that certain conditions
were met. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. MI1 2003). Although the D.C. Circuit has not set aside an
executive designation, neither has the Court accepted all of the government's claims. See, e.g., Nat'l
Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that a foreign
terrorist organization designation had not comported with due process).
17. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004).
18. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148 § 1005(e)(2)(A), 119 Stat.
2680 (2006).
19. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i).
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that judges should never invalidate antiterrorism policies because the execu-
tive is expert and the judges are not. Assuming, with the authors, that the
executive's antiterrorism measures are essentially routine agency action,
there is no reason to abandon the ordinary forms of judicial review over
agency action. Judges are perfectly capable of evaluating whether a pro-
posed antiterrorism action is reasonable.
POSTSCRIPT
A few weeks after I completed this essay, the Court handed down Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld. There, the dispute concerned special military commissions that
the President had proposed for trying individuals who were believed to be
members of al-Qaeda. Justice Stevens, writing for four Justices, found com-
mon ground with Justice Kennedy: "We agree with Justice Kennedy that the
procedures adopted to try Hamdan deviate from those governing courts-
martial in ways not justified by any 'evident practical need,' and, for that
reason, at least, fail to afford the requisite guarantees.' The Hamdan deci-
sion turns on a judgment that the executive may not reduce liberty without a
corresponding meaningful gain in security.
Hamdan is an example of the type of the quotidian judicial decision-
-making advocated in this essay. The Court rejected Posner and Vermeule's
view that the judiciary should stand aside and let the executive do as it
wishes. Instead, as suggested above, the Court insisted on the traditional yet
limited judicial role of asking whether an agency has a rational reason for its
actions. In this way at least, Hamdan contributes to the defense of our coun-
try by invalidating executive policies not grounded in practical need.
20. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
21. Id. at 2797-98.
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